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PATERNAL CUSTODY OF THE YOUNG CHILD
UNDER THE KENTUCKY NO-FAULT DIVORCE
ACT
INTRODUCTION
And a woman who held a babe against her bosom said, Speak
to us of Children.
And he said:
Your children are not your children.
They come through you but not from you,
And though they are with you yet they belong not to
you.'
In divorce custody proceedings, the courts of this century
2
have made the father clearly aware that "[y]our children are
not your children." This Comment examines paternal custody
in Kentucky since 1972 when the legislature adopted no-fault
divorce.3 One question is central to this examination: As be-
tween parents, has the no-fault divorce statute affected the
possibility of a father receiving custody of his young child?
Today, divorce is a reality for a vast number of people. In
1971 there were 12,052 divorces in Kentucky.4 Roughly one-half
of all divorces in the United States involve minor children. For
large numbers of parents, custody becomes a word charged
with emotion.' One popularly-styled book has noted: "Custody
fights bring out all the raw emotions, the neuroses, even the
I GmiAN, THE PROPHET, 17-18 (1963).
2 See text accompanying notes 8-14 infra for a discussion of custody decisions
before the 20th century.
3Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.010-.350 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS and re-
ferred to as the No-Fault Divorce Act].
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table
number 92 (94th ed. 1973)[hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
5 While exact figures seem to be unavailable, the one-half estimate is derived from
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 4, Table number 56 (44.8% of United States families
have no children)' and Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 1396 (1965) (which notes a one-half esti-
mate).
' Podell, Peck & First, Custody-To Which Parent?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. 51
(1972)[hereinafter cited as Podell](Judge Podell has been chairman of the Family
Law Section of the American Bar Association); Watson, The Children of Armageddon:
Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1969) (Dr. Watson is
both a professor of law and a professor of psychiatry at the University of Michigan).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66
paranoia of the parties."7 The judge not only senses the tension,
but must also make a difficult decision which plays upon the
most elemental of human emotions. Ultimately he must decide
against one party.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CUSTODY DECISIONS
A. Custody in the Nineteenth Century
Prior to the 20th century the chancellor usually awarded
custody to the father rather than the mother. The inferior eco-
nomic position of women, which would have left the mother
unable to support the child, and the inherited traditions of the
Roman law and English common law, which viewed the child
as part of the husband's property, governed these decisions.'
Kentucky decisions mentioned this common law rule favoring
the father as recently as 1913.1 Yet as early as 1864,10 Kentucky
courts were cognizant of emerging maternal rights" and held
that the superior paternal right might be surmounted by the
presumption that a child of tender years"2 could best be cared
F. ATHEARN, HOW TO DIVORCE YOUR WIFE 85 (1976).
Podell, supra note 6, at 51; Note, Paternal Custody of Minor Children, 5 MEM.
ST. L. REv. 223, 223-24 (1975); Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 6, 15-16 (1969).
Shehan v. Shehan, 153 S.W. 243 (Ky. 1913).
,0 Adams v. Adams, 62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 168 (1864).
"In his concurring opinion to Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872),
Justice Bradley noted:
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as
that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood
T .. he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id. at 141.
Bradwell, of course, was not a custody case. Its language is offered as exemplifying
the new emphasis placed on the role of mother in the late nineteenth century, an
emphasis that would free women from the presumption in favor of the father in custody
questions but, as Bradwell so ironically demonstrates, would also tie women tightly to
home and children and let them go no further. Ms. Bradwell was not permitted to
become an attorney.
" Although the "tender years" are defined more by intellectual maturity than
chronological age, 10 years seems to be the rough standard in Kentucky. Nicol v.
Conlan, 385 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1964); BLACK's LAW DIcroNARY 302 (4th ed. 1968)(14
years and under); Note, Child Custody in Kentucky Divorce Cases: 1940-1952, 41 KY.
L.J. 324, 325 (1953)(10 years and over not tender years).
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for by the mother. 13 For a time, then, in the late 19th century,
the law was in a period of transition. During the first quarter
of the 20th century, however, the preference for the mother
became firmly rooted in Kentucky law. 4
B. Custody Under Traditional Divorce Laws: The Best
Interests Test
With the decline of the virtually absolute paternal right, 5
the child's best interest has become the paramount concern of
the courts in making custody awards. 6 The best interest of the
child has become a doctrine, and the courts have evolved a test
by which to judge the child's best interest. 7 There are many
specific standards against which the potential custodians are
to be measured: (1) Financial sufficiency, 8 (2) health, 9 (3)
stability of location, 0 (4) affection for the child,2' (5) preference
of the child,2 2 (6) sex of the child,23 (7) sense of responsibility,
2 4
(8) physical environment and opportunities for playmates and
education,25 (9) present custodian of the child,26 (10) moral
character,27 (11) blood relationship to the child,s and (12) the
age of the child.
29
,1 See generally Riggins v. Riggins, 287 S.W. 715 (Ky. 1926); Wills v. Wills, 181
S.W. 619 (Ky. 1916); Shallcross v. Shallcross, 122 S.W. 223 (Ky. 1909).
" See notes 35-46 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of cases involving
the presumption in favor of maternal custody.
," For a good summary of Kentucky custody cases at mid-century, see Note, supra
note 12.
" Shallcross v. Shallcross, 122 S.W. 223 (Ky. 1909).
' Dr. Watson asserts that criteria for establishing the child's best interest are
"conspicuous by their absence" from statutes, and that the courts show little data to
reveal the bases of their decisions. Watson, supra note 6, at 56.
IS Estridge v. Taylor, 221 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1949).
West v. West, 171 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1943).
20 Sanders v. Felzman, 213 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1948).
21 Crase v. Shepherd, 240 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1951).
2 Cummins v. Bird, 19 S.W.2d 959 (Ky. 1929).
23 Fugate v. Fugate, 163 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1942).
11 Haymes v. Haymes, 269 S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1954).
2 Vanover v. Hunley, 218 S.W.2d 20 (Ky. 1949); Sanders v. Felzman, 213 S.W.2d
428 (Ky. 1948).
2, The court prefers not to move a child unless the present custodian is detrimental
to the child and the potential custodian is markedly better suited. Vanover v. Hunley,
218 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Ky. 1949).
21 West v. West, 171 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1943).
21 Johnson v. Cook, 120 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. 1938).
" Fugate v. Fugate, 163 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1942).
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The all-encompassing nature of this test suggests it is diffi-
cult to apply. How, for example, is one to measure one parent
strong in financial sufficiency against the other strong in
health? These standards are also liable to subjective misuse, as
the trial court might accord unwarranted importance to one
factor at the expense of others." Of course, as in any adversary
proceeding, the data brought forth at trial largely depends on
the skill and resourcefulness of the advocates.3
However, because of certain presumptions built into the
best interests test, it has not been as difficult to apply as it first
appears. The presumptions operate to preclude consideration
of the other criteria unless the party disfavored by the pre-
sumption produces evidence that the favored party is unfit.
While the courts have said that the trial court has the power
to vest custody in a third party,32 there is a presumption that
natural parents have a superior right to custody.3 A strong
showing that the natural parents are unfit is required to over-
come this preference. 34 As between the natural parents, the
mother is preferred.3 5 This maternal presumption, often called
the tender years presumption, is founded on the supposition
that the best interests of the child and maternal custody are
equivalent, that mothers are "better adapted to the care of the
child and best calculated to secure his or her happiness and
well-being. '38 Only with unequivocal evidence of the mother's
unfitness might the father secure custody of his young child.
37
30 Comment, Family Law-Custody of Children, 59 Ky. L.J. 529, 536 (1970).
31 Watson, supra note 6, at 57.
2 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 343 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1961).
Wilson v. Wilson, 255 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1953); Mason v. Williams, 176 S.W. 1171
(Ky. 1915). Accord, KRS § 405.020 (1970).
McKinney v. McKinney, 266 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1954).
35 McIntosh v. McIntosh, 464 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1971); Gernert v. Gernert, 457
S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970). See also Comment, Alimony, Property Settlement and Child
Custody under the New Divorce Statutes: No-fault Is Not Enough, 22 CATH. U. L. REv.
365 (1973).
36 Byers v. Byers, 370 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Ky. 1963). Accord, Estes v. Estes, 299
S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1957); Burke v. Burke, 103 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1937).
3T E.g., Dixon v. Dixon, 340 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1960)(alleged extra-marital sexual
relations merely indiscreet); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 287 S.W.2d 662 (Ky. 1955)(sexual rela-
tions with another man the mother later married did not render the mother promis-
cuous); Bowman v. Bowman, 233 S.W.2d 1020 (Ky. 1950)(mother must be shown to
be of unfit character or unable to provide suitable home); Runge v. Runge, 212 S.W.2d
275 (Ky. 1948)(wife unfaithful while husband overseas in military, not sufficient to
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Such damaging evidence was often introduced in the di-
vorce trial itself because of the fault basis of the old divorce
law,38 and the judge readily considered that evidence when
awarding custody. 39 If the misconduct had been grievous, the
tendency of the court was to award custody to the spouse not
at fault." However, the underlying principle was not to punish
the guilty spouse but rather to serve the best interests of the
child." Faults generally brought to the court's attention which
were sufficient to overcome the maternal presumption included
immoral behavior,42 excessive use of intoxicants, 3 neglect of
husband and child," and impaired physical or mental health.'
But fault was a two-edged sword, and just as the father could
present evidence of fault to cut off the maternal presumption,
so the mother could present evidence of equal or greater fault
in the father, thereby restoring her presumption. 6
Thus, prior to the 1972 revision of the divorce laws, the
father who sought custody of his young child faced two impos-
ing legal obstacles under Kentucky law: the best interests of
the child test and what one commentator has called the
show unfitness). Contra, Parker v. Parker, 467 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1971)(not necessary
to show wife unfit); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 458 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1970); Watson v.
Watson, 434 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1968); Yelton v. Yelton, 395 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1965). See
also text accompanying notes 75-88 infra for a discussion of the Parker line of cases.
21 CARmoLL's KENTUCKY STATUTES ch. 66, § 2117 (1922), as amended by 1946 Ky.
Acts ch. 14; 1950 Ky. Acts ch. 162; 1956 Ky. Acts ch. 72; and 1962 Ky. Acts ch. 210, §
49 (codified at KRS § 403.020 (1970)(repealed 1972)).
:' Bowman v. Bowman, 221 S.W.2d 71 (1949).
Meadors v. Meadors, 281 S.W. 180 (Ky. 1926).
" See Renfro v. Renfro, 291 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1956).
Wz ilkey v. Glisson, 303 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1957); Renfro v. Renfro, 291 S.W.2d 46
(Ky. 1956); Brumley v. Brumley, 247 S.W.2d 987 (Ky. 1952); Owen v. Owen, 240
S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1951). But see Dixon v. Dixon, 340 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1960)(alleged
extra-marital sexual relations merely indiscreet).
41 Turner v. Turner, 336 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1960). But cf. Estes v. Estes, 299 S.W.2d
785 (Ky. 1957)(mother's averment that she no longer used intoxicants sufficient to
support motion to modify custody).
" Donoho v. Donoho, 357 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1962); Singleton v. Singleton, 302
S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1957).
'1 Day v. Day, 347 S.W.2d 549 (Ky. 1961); Snider v. Snider, 302 S.W.2d 621 (Ky.
1957); Dayton v. Dayton, 161 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1942).
11 Sevier v. Sevier, 280 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1955)(mother accused of adultery and
father tried to kill her, mother awarded custody). Compare Sevier with Mandelstam
v. Mandelstam, 458 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1970), in which the Court denied custody to both
parents because of the "weird, abnormal, bizarre atmosphere" of the home. Id. at 788.
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"unfitness test,"47 the obverse of the maternal presumption. To
pass the first the father had to be an exemplary parent; to pass
the second he had to be a faultless husband and find grievous-
faults in his former spouse.
Perhaps the greatest obstacle faced by the would-be pater-
nal custodian is the disfavor of society generally. The courts
reflect this disfavor in viewing the father as an "unnatural"
custodian.18 Lawyers condone this disfavor by dissuading fa-
thers from seeking custody49 and generally taking a cynical
view of the father's motives." The effect has been to create a
maternal sanctuary few fathers dare attempt to violate.51
II. THE NO-FAULT DIVORCE ACT
The 1972 Kentucky Act Relating to Marriage and Divorce
2
(the No-Fault Divorce Act) and the custody provisions embod-
ied therein53 have done nothing to improve the father's position
vis-a-vis the mother in a custody dispute. On the contrary, if
the underlying spirit of the No-Fault Divorce Act is adhered to,
it may well diminish the father's opportunities for custody of
his young child.
The No-Fault Divorce Act54 is patterned after the Uniform
'7 Comment, The Father's Right to Child Custody in Interparental Disputes, 49
TuL. L. REv. 189 (1974).
11 Donoho v. Donoho, 357 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1962), expressed this view although the
Court reluctantly granted custody to the father.
11 The annotator of 23 A.L.R.3d 6, 20-21 (1969) suggests the attorney "dissuade"
a father from seeking custody "by reminding him that whatever may be the difficulties
between him and his wife, his wife is a good mother and better able to care for the
children than he is." Similar advice is found in J. BRAUN, SURVIVING DIVORCE 69 (1975):
"From a practical viewpoint, mothers may be better equipped physically, mentally,
and emotionally to serve the best interests of the child, particularly at a tender age."
50 J. BRAUN, supra note 49, at 70, 77-78. The author suggests that fathers find post-
divorce finances so difficult that they seek custody in order to avoid support payments.
Similarly, ATHRARN, supra note 7, at 85 states: "Sometimes a father will make custody
an issue simply to upset the mother or for leverage in bargaining for a lesser alimony
award . . . . In these cases the father does not really want custody. He probably
wouldn't know what to do with the children if he got them."
5, BRAUN, supra note 49, at 70 states: "Usually a departing father does not chal-
lenge custody in the mother . . . ." See Note, Child Custody: Preference to the
Mother, 34 LA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Child Custody]. The
author of Note, supra note 8, at 23 finds discrimination against fathers.
52 KRS § 403 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 403.260-.350 (Supp. 1976).
51 For a summary of the Act, see Note, Kentucky's New Dissolution of Marriage
Law, 61 Ky. L.J. 980 (1973).
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Marriage and Divorce Act (the Uniform Act)." The intent of
both is to eliminate the bitterness and hostility attendant to
divorce actions under the fault system. Divorce, it is reasoned,
should not be a remedy granted to an innocent spouse for mis-
conduct by the other spouse; it should be analogous to the
dissolution of a partnership. The No-Fault Divorce Act seeks
to "redirect the law's attention from an unproductive assign-
ment of blame to a search for the realities of the marital situa-
tion.""5 The Act focuses on whether there has been an irretriev-
able breakdown, not on the faults of the parties.
The No-Fault Divorce Act and the Uniform Act apply the
no-fault concept to child custody determinations as well.57 The
rationale is that a proceeding based on the old fault concepts
would "redound inevitably to the future, and perhaps perma-
nent, disadvantage, of the child."5 With both parties blaming
each other and creating additional tension and animosity, post-
divorce cooperation, so vital to the welfare of the child, would
be precluded. Ironically, the welfare of the child would itself
become secondary in such a proceeding as the parents exposed
each other's faults in order to win custody. Therefore, under the
No-Fault Divorce Act marital misconduct is considered irrele-
vant unless it directly affects the child .5 The parents are en-
couraged to put aside their animosities, to be concerned with
the child they presumably love, and to arrange custody without
litigation. The court is not, however, bound by such arrange-
ments and will view them only as suggestions when considering
the best interests of the child.60
5 Compare NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE ACT (1970) [hereinafter cited and referred to as the UNIFORM ACT] with
KRS § 403 (Supp. 1976). See Note, supra note 54, for such a comparison. For present
purposes, the minor differences within the custody provisions are of no concern.
5, UNIFORM ACr, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
Id. "Fault notions . . . were deliberately and expressly excised."
' Watson, supra note 6, at 58.
5, Callow, Custody of the Child and Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S. DAK.
L. REv. 551, 553-55 (1973); Watson, supra note 6, at 58, 65. But cf. Comment, Oregon's
No-Fault Divorce Law: Effect on Custody, Property Division, and Support, 55 ORE.
L. REv. 267, 269-70, 275-76 (1976)(both parties and judges consider misconduct rele-
vant).
,0 KRS § 403.180(1) (Supp. 1976); UNIFORM ACT §§ 303(b)(5), 306(a). But cf.
Comment, supra note 59, at 269 n.15 (discourages out-of-court settlement because
"guilty" party need not fear judicial reprobf or chastisement and will therefore litigate
to get what he can).
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The best interests of the child test is the heart of the cus-
tody provisions of the No-Fault Divorce Act."1 In determining
the effect of the Act on paternal custody, a crucial question is:
Is the old maternal presumption still a relevant factor? The
question becomes more important in light of Section 2 of the
Act, which injects the no-fault concept into the custody deter-
mination: "(2) The court shall not consider conduct of a pro-
posed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the
child.""2 If the maternal presumption, and its obverse, the un-
fitness test, are not relevant factors, the new statute has placed
both father and mother on an equal plane.13 If the maternal
presumption remains a relevant factor, Section 2 has the po-
tential of partially stripping the father of his ability to meet the
unfitness test and to negate the maternal presumption by
showing the mother at fault and therefore unfit. Much depends
on the final caveat in the statute, "that does not affect [her]
relationship to the child,"64 and how it will be interpreted by
the courts.
IlI. INTERPRETING THE NO-FAULT DIVORCE ACT
Four broad questions must be examined and answered in
light of the court decisions interpreting the Act: (1) Is the trial
court limited to consideration of the factors enumerated in the
statute? (2) If the trial court is not so limited, is the maternal
presumption one of the relevant factors upon which the trial
court may rest its decision? (3) If the maternal presumption is
" KRS § 403.270 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Custody-Best interest of the child shall determine.-
(1) The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(b) The wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may
significantly affect the child's best interests;
(d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and
(e) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
62 KRS § 403.270(2)(Supp. 1976).
13 Note, supra note 8, suggests that the Act does indeed equalize the status of
mothers and fathers: "Thus the Act would require courts to employ egalitarian stan-
dards between fathers and mothers of minor children." Id. at 231.
64 KRS § 403.270(2)(Supp. 1976).
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still vital, how does the no-fault provision of Section 2 affect
the father in view of the unfitness test, the necessity to find
fault in the mother's conduct? (4) What misconduct does or
does not affect the potential custodian's relationship to the
child?
A. Scope of the Trial Court's Inquiry
The plain meaning of the statutory words, "The court shall
consider all relevant factors including . . .,"I' leaves little
doubt that the enumerated factors are only some of the factors
the trial court should consider. The comments to the Uniform
Act" favor a thorough judicial inquiry, noting that the court
can order an investigation in the face of joint opposition by the
parents when custody is contested. Less reliance is placed on
use of the adversary process to obtain information. Addition-
ally, it is widely recognized that the trial court has wide discre-
tion in custodial adjudications."
This interpretation of the Act is in complete accord with
prior case law, which left the inquiry to the trial court's broad
discretion. In Dudgeon v. Dudgeon, the Court noted: "[Tihe
trial judge's discretion in determining the best interest and
welfare of the children when making a custody award is indeed
broad. . . . [T]his court has continually refused to establish
rigid guidelines which a trial court should follow when deter-
mining questions of child custody."" In addition to the broad
scope of the trial court's inquiry, "a very clear and substantial
showing of manifest error. . . [was] required before an appel-
late court should undertake to substitute its judgment. ... 1
Predictably, since the adoption of the No-Fault Divorce
Act the case law has generally reaffirmed the broad discretion
of the trial court. In Eviston v. Eviston, the Court was quite
explicit: "In reviewing the decision, the test is not whether we
0 KRS § 403.270(1)(Supp. 1976)(emphasis added).
" UNIFORM Aar, Commissioners' Note to § 404.
"Bradbrook, An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of the Judges of the Supreme
Court of Ontario Regarding the Working of the Present Child Custody Adjudication
Laws, 49 CAN. B. REv. 557 (1971). The author's remark may be fairly interpreted as
applying to both Canadian and United States courts.
458 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Ky. 1970).
" Id. at 161. Accord, Grider v. Grider, 254 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1953).
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would have decided differently but whether the findings of the
trial judge were clearly erroneous or he abused his discretion. '70
The Court has also ruled that the use of reports by social work-
ers was within judicial discretion,71 as was interviewing only
one of the three children involved in a custody proceeding. 72
The trial judge's discretion remains broad. He is not lim-
ited to consideration of the factors statutorily enumerated; he
may range beyond those to all relevant factors.
B. The Maternal Presumption
The maternal presumption remains a vital doctrine. The
commentary to the Uniform Act explicitly recognizes it and
urges its application:
Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by the
case law are mentioned here, the language of the section is
consistent with preserving such rules of thumb. The prefer-
ence for the mother as custodian of young children when all
things are equal, for example, is simply a shorthand method
of expressing the best interests of the child, and this section
enjoins judges to decide custody cases according to that gen-
eral standard.
73
In Casale v. Casale, the Kentucky Supreme Court pointedly
took note of that commentary and held it to be inherent in the
custody provisions of the No-Fault Divorce Act, with the result
that "the natural preference for the mother should prevail. 7
Because the maternal presumption remains strong, it is
important to examine the unfitness test and the effect of the
no-fault custody provision. However, it is first necessary to
consider the Parker line of cases decided prior to the No-Fault
Divorce Act.
11 507 S.W.2d at 153 (Ky. 1974). Accord, Calhoun v. Calhoun, No. 76-481 (Ky.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977); Wilhoit v. Wilhoit, 521 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1975).
11 Lewis v. Lewis 534 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1976).
72 Brown v. Brown 510 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1974).
" UNIFORM Acr, § 402, Commissioners' Note.
71 Casale v. Casale, No. 76-273, slip op. at 4 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977). Accord,
Eviston v. Eviston, 507 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1974). See Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d 639
(Ky. 1973) (on appeal from reconsideration directed by the Ky. Court of Appeals (pred-
ecessor court to the Ky. Supreme Court), the Court affirmed the lower court ruling,
516"S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1974)).
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C. The Unfitness Test Discarded: Parker v. Parker
Parker v. Parker'5 was decided in 1971. It seemed to redress
the imbalance between mother and father by discarding the
unfitness test, explicitly affirming a legal equality ofthe par-
ents, and more formally establishing criteria by which the best
interests of the child must be measured. This case warrants
particular attention because it represents a departure from
prior case law. Despite a later judicial pronouncement to the
contrary,' 6 Parker is at odds with the No-Fault Divorce Act and
subsequent cases.
The facts of the Parker case are significant. Lena and
James Parker became estranged when Lena "left her home and
family and spent one or more nights in a motel room with
another man."" Following a brief reconciliation and subse-
quent absences of his wife from their home, James Parker filed
for divorce in 1966. James and Lena agreed that James should
have custody of their children, ages 10, 9, and 5 years, and the
agreement was made part of the judgment. James and the
children continued to live with Lena's parents until he remar-
ried. James then left the children in the home of their maternal
grandparents, established his own home nearby, visited the
children frequently, and provided support. The reason James
made this arrangement is not explained in the opinion. Lena,
who also had remarried, later sought a modification of the cus-
tody award. Her motion was denied and she appealed. 8
Lena's contention was that "being the mother of young
children she is entitled to their custody under previous rulings
of this court and the mere fact that she is guilty of an
'indiscretion' will not deprive her of that right." 9 This repre-
sents the classic statement of the maternal presumption/
unfitness test: A mother cannot be denied her children unless
found unfit.
73 467 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1971).
"1 The Court stated in Casale: "Our holding here is not, in our opinion, inconsist-
ent with Parker ... " Casale v. Casale, No. 76-273, slip op. at 4 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan.
14, 1977).
7 467 S.W.2d at 595.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 596. The Court accepted Lena's appellation of her conduct as an indiscre-
tion "[e]ven though that label may be wanting in some respects . . . because of its
brevity." Id. at 595.
1977]
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In affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals rejected
unfitness as a test: "We do not believe it is indispensable that
a trial court find that a mother is morally unfit to have custody
of children as a prerequisite of awarding custody to the fa-
ther.""0 As parents. "they have equal rights. ' 81 The Court then
went on to reduce motherhood from its status as a presumption
to "more a practical consideration than a rule of law."81 2 The
Court outlined the factors which a trial court should consider
in an excellent summary of the best interests test as it is scat-
tered throughout the earlier cases.
In Parker, the Court relied on Yelton v. Yelton and
Watson v. Watson." In the Yelton case, Mary Ann, the mother,
originally had been awarded custody of the two children, then
9 and 5 years old. The father later won a modification decree
giving him custody of the children even though the trial judge
had not found Mary Ann to be unfit. Mary Ann appealed. In
affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the following facts.
After her divorce, Mary Ann married Foster Haley. Not long
after the marriage, Haley was convicted of dealing in illegal
liquor and imprisoned. Mary Ann took the children with her
when visiting Haley. With Haley still imprisoned, Mary Ann
first moved to Washington state, then back to Kentucky, then
to California, and back to Kentucky again, all within approxi-
mately 8 months. Haley was released and again convicted of
illegal dealing in alcoholic beverages. Mary Ann again visited
Haley with the children. With Haley back in prison, Mary Ann
subsisted on public assistance and support payments from
Phillip.1
5
The Watson case involved an attempt by the mother to
modify an award of custody to the father. Although the Court
of Appeals did not explicitly find her morally unfit, the trial
court's decree was affirmed. The Court stated that appellant's
A Id. at 596.
81 Id.
s Id.
395 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1965).
8 434 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1968).
" 395 S.W.2d at 590. The Court also notes: "There is some indication that [Mary
Ann] proclaimed that she and Haley had been married at a time earlier than the
actual wedding date." Id. at 591. This comment has little significance to the case
unless the court offered it as a euphemism for fornication.
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relationship with another man during her marriage evinced "an
imprudence and lack of good judgment that would justify some
doubt as to her fitness. . . .," and noted that the mother had
allegedly been "guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct."' ,
The weakness of the decision in Parker,87 and in the Yelton
and Watson cases upon which Parker is based, follows from the
factual situations involved. 88 While this line of cases ostensibly
renounces the unfitness test, it does so in factual situations
which cast doubt on the Court's sincerity. The Court does not
explicitly find the mother unfit, yet implicitly does so by re-
counting factual circumstances which suggest immoral behav-
ior or behavior which could be classified as detrimental to the
children. Any subsequent case involving a mother with discre-
tion and prudence could easily be distinguished from Parker on
the facts. The issue then becomes: Would the Court award
custody to the father purely on a showing he could best meet
the interests of the child and require no showing that the
mother was unfit? The Court's sincerity in abrogating the un-
fitness test could only be tested in a situation where the mother
did not have glaring faults. Still, following the decision in
Parker the unfitness test was theoretically laid to rest-for a
time.
D. The Unfitness Test Revived: Casale v. Casale
Six years later, the unfitness test was resurrected. Casale
v. Casale8 1 presented a factual situation involving a discreet
and prudent mother. After extensive findings of fact, the trial
court awarded custody to the father. The mother appealed.
The record revealed that both parents loved and wanted the
child, that both cared for the child on a daily basis, and that
neither was unfit to have custody. Without acknowledging the
" 434 S.W.2d at 34.
,0 While not cited in the Parker decision, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 458 S.W.2d 451
(Ky. 1970) is in accord: "We do not believe that a finding of unfitness is any longer
necessary." Id. at 45. The facts revealed "Mrs. Hamilton's attachment to a man other
than her husband." Id.
m It is also disturbing that after Yelton, though prior to Hamilton, Watson, and
Parker, the Court was able to say that "[i]n the absence of proof to the contrary the
mother is considered best fitted to care for the needs of young children." Knight v.
Knight 419 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1967)(emphasis added).
U No. 76-273 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977).
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wide discretion accorded the trial court as a matter of law, the
Supreme Court reversed:
While we could agree that the testimony taken as a whole
could be evaluated to indicate a marginal preference for the
father as the most suitable person to have custody of the
child, the test is the best interest of the child, and it is in this
respect that we believe the trial court erred in awarding cus-
tody to the father.9 0
The error lay in failing to consider properly the maternal pre-
sumption now inherent in Kentucky's statutory law by virtue
of the commentary to the Uniform Act. The Court reasoned
that despite the lower court finding that the mother in this case
was not better suited to have custody,92 the relative strengths
of the mother and father were equal "[f]or all practical pur-
poses . . . . 3 Therefore "the preference that the mother
should have custody of a young child has not been overcome
. . 7)" In the Very same paragraph the Court explicitly states
that Parker discarded the unfitness test and later states that
the Casale opinion is consistent with Parker.5
On the one hand, the two opinions can be rationalized to
a degree because they involve different facts. Furthermore,
both opinions insist that the father need only show he is clearly
better suited to be custodian. He can make that showing by
establishing his own superior, positive parental attributes or by
proving his own positive attributes and proving the mother
unfit. It could be said then that Casale and Parker are only
holding that as a matter of law the mother need not be shown
unfit-there is no required unfitness test and any such showing
is purely voluntary.
On the other hand, the spirit of parental equality underly-
ing the Parker decision is contradicted in "the preference ...
has not been overcome" language of the Casale opinion, and
any attempt to rationalize the two cases is strained. How supe-
I Id., Slip op. at 2-3.
" The commentary is reprinted in text accompanying note 73.
2 The mother was not better suited to have custody because she was "very self-
centered." No. 76-273, slip op. at 2.
, Id. at 4.




rior must the father's parental attributes be? If the mother is
x good, must the father be x + 1, or x + 10? While Casale holds
the father must be more than marginally better suited, the
Court was "not prepared to define precisely the quantum of
proof necessary to overcome the preference that the mother
should be the custodian of children of tender years. '"" But if
the father was found marginally better suited to be custodian,
why is the mother awarded custody? The compelling answer is
the father's failure to meet the unfitness test by introducing
evidence of fault against the mother.
Except in the unusual case where the mother is merely a
good parent and the father is a clearly superior parent, the
father must prove the mother unfit to be custodian as a practi-
cal matter, if not as a matter of law. As long as motherhood but
not fatherhood is considered equivalent to the best interest of
the child the father must diminish the esteem with which the
court presumptively views the mother.
E. The No-Fault Divorce Act and Application of the
Unfitness Test
The spirit of the No-Fault Divorce Act certainly militates
against the consideration of prior misconduct. But the custody
provision is at least one avenue to the admission of such evi-
dence" because the trial judge may hear testimony concerning
misconduct that affects the child. The type of misconduct
which affects the child is largely a matter of judicial discretion.
Some judges believe that only misconduct which the child can
hear or see or otherwise know about would be admissible. Oth-
ers view habitual bad conduct as indicative of a bad character
which will inevitably have at least an indirect impact on the
child. 8
Of the faults that have been sufficient to overcome the
maternal presumption in the past,9" three clearly affect the
child and would undoubtedly be admissible in a custody
" Id. at 1-2.
Note, supra note 54, at 1002.
' Id. at 996; Note, Kentucky's No Fault Divorce: Theory and The Practical
Experience, 13 J. FAM. L. 567, 580-81 (1973-74).
" See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra for a listing of such faults.
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adjudication: (1) Mental or physical impairment, ' either of
which could not fairly be called misconduct and would not
even be subject to the misconduct test; (2) neglect of the
child,101 and (3) excessive use of intoxicants.1 2 Neglect of the
husband and immoral behavior-generally a euphemism for
adultery or conduct approaching adultery-fall within the
discretionary twilight zone. As any survey of the cases will
reveal, adultery was one of the faults commonly introduced
under the old custody provisions. In two recent cases the Ken-
tucky Court has admitted such evidence,' 3 and no Kentucky
court has yet found such conduct irrelevant as a matter of law,
a finding which would exclude it from the trial court's exami-
nation. There are few indications as to how judges will measure
the proscription on irrelevant misconduct and wh6ther evi-
dence of adultery is proscribed or relevant. Under the old fault
system, judges occasionally took a permissive view of adulter-
ous behavior and labeled it mere indiscretion.' 4
F. The Effect of the No-Fault Divorce Act on Paternal
Custody
At the very best, the No-Fault Divorce Act has done noth-
ing to improve the opportunities for paternal custody. By possi-
bly limiting the father's opportunity to use the mother's trans-
gressions against her in the custody proceeding-and the ex-
tent of such limitation remains to be seen-the No-Fault Di-
vorce Act may have weakened the father's position. To the
extent that the Parker line of cases briefly offered equal rights
to the father by explicitly stating such equality and by mini-
mizing the maternal presumption, the No-Fault Divorce Act,
,m Such evidence was admitted in Calhoun v. Calhoun, No. 76-481 (Ky. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 14, 1977) and Bond v. Shepherd, 509 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1974).
'"' Admitted as evidence in Cox v. Bramblet, 492 S.W.2d 188 (Ky. 1973).
'' Admitted as evidence in Bond v. Shepherd, 509 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1973).
,03 Bond v. Shepherd, 509 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1973) and Dowell v. Dowell, 490
S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1973). One commentator, in reviewing the No-Fault Divorce Act,
hypothesized that evidence of a discreet sexual liaison during the separation period
should not be admitted. Note, supra note 54, at 996 n.91. Another commentator study-
ing judicial attitudes found that many judges would exercise their discretion based on
"the use of common sense on an individual case basis" in considering the admissibility
of such evidence. Note, supra note 98, at 580.




as interpreted in Casale, has set the paternal cause back again
by revitalizing the maternal presumption and reinstituting the
unfitness test as a practical matter if not as a rule of law.'05
Until the Court answers the very question it raised in
Casale by ruling on "the quantum of proof necessary to over-
come the preference that the mother should be the custodian
" . .,2'01 the mother who passes the best interests test will pre-
vail over the father even if he also passes the test. As the Court
has applied the test, the mother and father are not compared
against each other: the test measures each individually. If both
pass, the maternal preference gives the mother custody unless
the father meets the unfitness test by introducing evidence of
fault against the mother.
The weakness in the Parker decision, which supposedly
abrogated the unfitness test, is the failure to realize that the
maternal presumption and the unfitness test are really differ-
ent sides of the same coin. One cannot discard one side and
retain the other-the Casale decision makes that quite evident.
Disregarding the wide discretion traditionally afforded the trial
judge, the Court discounted the finding of fact that the father
was better suited to be custodian, and on the strength of a
presumption, the maternal presumption, the Court awarded
custody to the mother.
CONCLUSION
In the best interest of the child, the theory underlying the
maternal presumption should be re-examined. The maternal
'" The Casale Court, in rationalizing the decision in Parker, also notes that the
Parker holding was reached in a case involving a request for modification, implying
that the strong reluctance of the Court to alter custody overcame the maternal pre-
sumption with the result that the father retained custody. But the slate is not so clean.
Yelton, upon which Parker relies, also involved a modification of custody, and in
Yelton the Court took custody from the mother and awarded custody to the father.
Thus the Court in Yelton viewed the best interest of the child as superior to the
preference for the present custodian, reduced the maternal presumption to a mere
consideration, and did not require a showing of the mother's unfitness. Casale v.
Casale, No. 75-756, slip op. at 4-5 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977); Yelton v. Yelton, 395
S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1965).
Clearly the Parker line of cases was moving the Court away from the maternal
presumption/unfitness test despite the vulnerability of the cases because of their fac-
tual circumstances.
NI No. 76-481, slip op. at 4.
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presumption may well be invalid in law and in fact. At least
one court' 7 and several commentators' 8 have challenged the
presumption's constitutionality. Others have also questioned
its factual basis.'09
Nurturing is essentially learned behavior ' 0 and as such
can be learned by either parent. When the female exclusively
occupied the role of nurturer, directly tending the child, and
the male occupied the role of provider, necessary but distant
from the child, there was a certain logic that the mother should
have custody of young children. The traditional divorce only
continued the traditional roles-the mother continued to tend
the immediate needs of the child, and the father, more distant
now, provided support payments. That judges often view the
situation in this stereotypical fashion is borne out in Brad-
brook's study of judicial attitudes. Several of the judges in his
sample noted that their preference for the mother would disap-
pear were she to take a full-time job in the post-divorce situa-
tion."'
More and more, post-divorce reality forces the mother into
fulltime employment;" 2 she becomes the head of a household,
and she assumes a traditional father role in addition to her
traditional mother role. Fewer women than men remarry after
divorce." 3 Under the maternal preference rule, more children
are necessarily raised in single parent situations"' where the
woman must assume both roles. Indeed, the pre-divorce situa-
tion finds more women assuming part of the traditional father
"I Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973), cited in Comment, supra
note 47, at 201-02.
I" Id.; Child Custody, supra note 51; Comment, Male Parent versus Female Par-
ent: Separate and Unequal Rights, 43 UMKC L. REv. 392 (1975).
'1' Bradbrook, supra note 67, at 565; Podell, supra note 6, at 51-53. See Batt, Child
Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological Approach to Proof and
Decisionmaking, 12 WILLAMErrE L.J. 491 (1976).
Watson, supra note 6, at 72.
Bradbrook, supra note 67, at 565.
112 Podell, supra note 6, at 53.
I,? There are 1,781,000 divorced men and 3,052,000 divorced women. The longer
life expectancy of women cannot account for the disparity of these figures; a significant
number of men who obtain divorces remarry. STATISTIcAL ABsTmRCT, supra note 4,
Table number 46.
'" There are 214,000 divorced men with children and 1,487,000 divorced women
with children. Id., Table number 43.
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role by being employed outside the home."5 Conversely, men
can be, and more are, involved in the nurturing role. ' As one
commentator put it: "When a 'woman's place was in the
home,' the maternal preference rule may have had some mar:
ginal value as a consideration in awarding custody; today it is
an invalid consideration: after all . . . a man can hire a baby
sitter as well as a woman."117 But the point is: If both potential
custodians would be assuming dual roles in the post-divorce
situation, what justification exists to apply a sex-based
presumption?
The Casale decision demonstrates how arbitrary the appli-
cation can be. The trial judge found that "both parents partici-
pated in the day-to-day care of the child"118 and that the father
was better suited to be custodian; yet the Supreme Court ap-
plied the maternal presumption, reversed the trial court, and
awarded custody to the mother."9 The trial judge had applied
the spirit underlying the maternal presumption by awarding
custody to the parent who had played a nurturing role, the
father. The Supreme Court let words distort meaning by focus-
ing on the gender term "maternal" rather than the intent of the
presumption. Because of the change in societal roles, the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky should fully reevaluate the maternal
presumption, not to give fatherhood greater rights than moth-
erhood, but to equalize the rights of fathers and mothers. The
equality of right between parents is a clearly emerging social,
economic, and psychological reality. That equality cannot be
ignored if the best interests test is to function properly. 2
Equality should be recognized in the law and the real spirit of
Parker should be given legal and actual vitalty. Yet, as Parker
implies, the equality of right is only the background. The reev-
aluation of the maternal presumption is necessary because in
the foreground stands the child, and the best interest of the
child is too important to be left to presumptions.
David A. Bratt
"2 Id., Table number 353; Comment, supra note 47.
' Comment, supra note 47, at 199-200.
27 Id.
" No. 76-273, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 1977).
' Id. at 1-2.
' Podell, supra note 6, at 51-52; Note, supra note 8, at 233-34. See Batt, supra
note 109.
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